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Hall: Judicial Deference to Collectively Bargained Pension Agreements:

JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO COLLECTIVELY
BARGAINED PENSION AGREEMENTS: THE
IMPLICIT ECONOMICS OF A LEGAL
STANDARD
David Locke Hall*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The disappointed pensioner is a compelling plaintiff. If his pension fund's trustees decline to extend him a particular benefit, his
interests are compromised at a time when he is least able to bargain
for reconsideration. The widow of a pension beneficiary is still more
compelling because she has even less bargaining power. And yet, in
United Mine Workers of America Health and Retirement Funds v.
Robinson', the United States Supreme Court rejected the plea of a
group of widows whose interests had been bargained away by their
late husbands' union.
The Robinson Court's holding has no obvious explanation, other
than stare decisis. This article will explain the Robinson holding in
the non-obvious terms of economics. The narrowest purpose of this
economic analysis is to translate a Supreme Court opinion from its
specific terms into more general terms. If this analysis is successful,
moreover, the article will serve the broader purpose of providing an
example of how economics can be used to understand the law.
* Member, Pennsylvania Bar; Associate, Drinker Biddle & Reath. A.B., 1978,
Dartmouth College; M.P.P.M., 1982, Yale University; M.A., (Economics), 1985, J.D., 1985,

University of Pennsylvania. The author would like to thank the following individuals for valuable advice and criticism: Michael L. Wachter, Director of the University of Pennsylvania Insti-

tute for Law and Economics; Seth F. Kreimer of the University of Pennsylvania Law School;
F. Douglas Raymond III and Robert S. Adelson, members of the Pennsylvania Bar; and Wil-

liam H. Carter, doctoral candidate in economics at the University of Pennsylvania. The author
also wishes to acknowledge with gratitude the research support granted by the Norman and
Rosita Winston Foundation, Inc. through the University of Pennsylvania Institute for Law and
Economics. The author is solely responsible for the content of this article.
1. 455 U.S. 562 (1982). For a discussion of UMW v. Robinson, see Supreme Court
Report: Labor Law . . . Health Funds, 68 A.B.A. J. 740 (1982); Note, Employee Benefit
Funds Under 302(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act: UMW Health and Retirement
Funds v. Robinson, 24 B.C.L. REV. 152 (1982).
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The Robinson Court held that the trustees of a pension fund
violated neither Section 302(c)(5) of the Labor Management Relations Act 2 nor "any other federal law"' when they enforced, to the
disadvantage of certain mineworkers' widows, an ostensibly arbitrary
provision of the collective bargaining agreement of the United Mine
Workers. The United Mine Workers, during collective bargaining,
had accepted the demand of a mine operators' trade association that
the widows of miners who were eligible for pension benefits but
working at the time of their deaths be excluded from an extension of
health benefits being granted to the widows of miners who had died
while retired. The extension of health benefits to the latter group of
widows left them with lifetime coverage under the health plan.'
Although the excluded widows were not denied a benefit to
which they had been entitled before the collective bargaining negotiations, 5 they were denied a new benefit that other widows received. 6
This unhappy result was endorsed by the Supreme Court.
This article will show that while the Robinson Court provided a
coherent legal rationale for its holding, the Court failed to offer a
justification other than stare decisis. As an example of legal reasoning, Robinson is flawless. But the fact-specific opinion of the Robinson Court does not express a principle to guide the judiciary in future cases involving interference with the benefits of pension
beneficiaries. Nevertheless, Robinson does contain an implicit principle, which this article will present in terms of the economics of internal labor markets. Since this internal labor market model is descriptively consistent with the Robinson decision, it provides a plausible,
although not necessarily exclusive, justification for the Court's holding. The internal labor market model thus can serve as a reference
point or model for future cases of this kind.
The article will consider the Robinson holding in some detail
and will describe the internal labor market model, contrasting it with
the more familiar spot labor market model. Both economic models
will be applied to the Robinson decision, translating into the language of microeconomics, the language of both the Supreme Court
2. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(1982).
3. Robinson, 455 U.S. at 576.
4. Id. at 567.
5. "Under established contract principles, vested retirement rights may not be altered
without the pensioner's consent. See generally Note, 70 COL. L. REV. 909, 916-920 (1970)."
Robinson, 455 U.S. at 575, n. 14 (citing Allied Chemical and Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 181, n.20 (1971)).
6. "[T]he union received no separately identifiable quid pro quo for the [concession]."
Robinson, 455 U.S. at 567.
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and the circuit court that was reversed.

II.
A.

ROBINSON

The pre-Robinson State of Law: NLRB v. Amax Coal Co.'
Section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)

prohibits employer contributions to unions.8 Section 302(c)(5) of the
LMRA specifically provides an exception for payments into a trust
fund "for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees." 9 Before

the Robinson decision, the Supreme Court had never directly addressed the question of the standard of judicial review of decisions
made by trustees under the authority of a section 302(c)(5) trust. 10
In NLRB v. Amax," the Supreme Court had found, one term

before Robinson, that Congress intended to impose on [section
7. NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322 (1981).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(2)(1982).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(1982).
10. Id.
The provisions of this section shall not be applicable. . .(5) with respect to money
or other thing of value paid to a trust fund established by such representative, for
the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees of such employer, and their families
and dependents (or of such employees, families, and dependents jointly with the
employees of other employers making similar payments, and their families and dependents): Provided,That (A) such payments are held in trust for the purpose of
paying, either from principal or income or both, for the benefit of employees, their
families and dependents, for medical or hospital care, pensions on retirement or
death of employees, compensation for injuries or illness resulting from occupational
activity or insurance to provide any of the foregoing or unemployment benefits or
life insurance, disability and sickness insurance, or accident insurance; (B) the detailed basis on which such payments are to be made is specified in a written agreement with the employer, and employees and employers are equally represented in
the administration of such fund, together with such neutral persons as the representatives of the employers and the representatives of the employees may agree upon
and in the event the employer and employee groups deadlock on the administration
of such fund and there are no neutral persons empowered to break such deadlock,
such agreement provides that the two groups shall agree on an impartial umpire to
decide such dispute, or in event of their failure to agree within a reasonable length
of time, an impartial umpire to decide such dispute shall, on petition of either
group, be appointed by the district court of the United States for the district where
the trust fund has its principal office, and shall also contain provisions for an annual
audit of the trust fund, a statement of the results of which shall be available for
inspection by interested persons at the principal office of the trust fund and at such
other places as may be designated in such written agreement; and (C) such payments as are intended to be used for the purpose of providing pensions or annuities
for employees are made to a separate trust which provides that the funds held
therein cannot be used for any purpose other than paying such pensions or annuities
Id.
11.

453 U.S. 322 (1981).
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302(c)(5)] trustees traditional fiduciary duties.' 2 The Amax Court
found this in the course of holding that employee benefit trustees are
not "representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the
adjustment of grievances' within the meaning of section 8(b)(1)(B)"
of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). aa
Amax involved a dispute between the United Mine Workers of
America (UMWA) and the Amax Coal Company (Amax). The dispute involved a proposal by Amax to establish an independent pension plan for employees working at a particular Amax mine at Belle
Ayre, Wyoming.' 4 The UMWA rejected this proposal and insisted
that Amax contribute instead to the Union's national pension trust.'5
Amax, as a member of the Bituminous Coal Operators Association
(BCOA), a multiemployer organization which bargains with the
UMWA, had agreed as a party to a BCOA-UMWA collective bargaining agreement, to contribute to a national trust fund for the benefit of employees other than those at Belle Ayre. 16 The Belle Ayre
negotiations reached an impasse, and the UMWA went out on
strike. 17 Amax filed a section 8(b)(1)(B) unfair labor practice
charge with the National Labor Relations Board, claiming that the
UMWA strike was a prohibited attempt to force Amax to join a
multiemployer bargaining unit.' 8 The question before the Amax
Court ultimately became whether the management-appointed trustee
of a pension trust fund is a collective bargaining representative of
the employer.' 9 If so, the strike would have violated National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) section 8(b)(1)(B) since its purpose would
have been to force Amax to agree to be represented by the BCOA
with respect to the pension benefits of the Belle Ayre employees. The
Amax Court found, on the basis of legislative intent, that the trustee
was not a representative of the employer.20
The Amax Court determined legislative intent by inference
from Congressional silence: "[g]iven . . . Congress' use of terms

long established in the courts of chancery, we must infer that Con12. Id. at 323.
13.

Id. at 334-38. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1982) (Section (b) states that, "it shall be

an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents - (1) to restrain or coerce...
(B) an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining
or the adjustment of grievances.")
14. Amax, 453 U.S. at 326.
15. Id.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 327.
Id. at 328.

20. Id. at 328-38.
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gress intended to impose on trustees traditional fiduciary duties unless Congress had unequivocally expressed an intent to the
'
contrary."'2
Furthermore, the Amax Court, seeking some explicit Congressional directive, found one in the Employee Retirement Income Security *Act (ERISA).22 Thus, while the LMRA implicitly imports
traditional common law trust rules into federal statutory law,23 the
ERISA explicitly does so. Both the ERISA and section 302(c)(5) of
the LMRA establish that pension fund trustees owe duties not to the
parties who appointed them but to the trust beneficiaries exclusively.24 Since a management-appointed pension fund trustee cannot
be considered a representative of management, he cannot be considered a management representative for the purposes of collective bargaining. 25 Thus, section 8(b)(1)(B) "does not limit the freedom of a
union to try to induce an employer to select a particular [section]
302(c)(5) trustee." 28 After Amax, the ERISA and section 302(c)(5)
of the LMRA impose the same set of duties on pension fund trustees.2 To the extent that the trustees' duties are inconsistent with
those of collective bargaining representatives, the pension fund trustees cannot be considered bargaining representatives.2 8
The atmosphere in which employee benefit trust fund beneficiaries
must operate, as mandated by [section] 302(c)(5) and ERISA, is
wholly inconsistent with this [collective bargaining] process of compromise and economic pressure. The management-appointed and
union-appointed trustees do not bargain with each other to set the
21.

Id. at 330. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637 (1980).

22.

29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461 (1982 and Supp. 1 1983).

Whatever may have remained implicit in Congress' view of the employee benefit
fund trustee under the act became explicit when Congress passed the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) ...ERISA essentially codified the
strict fiduciary standards that a § 302(c)(5) trustee must meet . . . Section
404(a)(1) of ERISA requires a trustee to 'discharge his duties . . .solely in the

interest of the participants and beneficiaries.

.

.' Section 406(b)(2) declares that a

trustee may not 'act in any transaction involving the plan on behalf of a party (or

represent a party) whose interests are adverse to the interests of the plan or the
interests of its participants or beneficiaries

. .

. ' Section 405(a) imposes on each

trustee an affirmative duty to prevent every other trustee of the same fund from
breaching fiduciary duties, including the duty to act solely on behalf of the

beneficiaries.
Amax, 453 U.S. at 332-33 (citations omitted).
23. Id.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.at 334.
Id. at 328-34.
Id. at 334.
Id. at 332.
Id. at 336-37.
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terms of the employer-employee contract;

.

. [rather], the trust-

ees have an obligation to enforce the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement regarding employee fund contributions .... 9
The Amax rule simply states that pension fund trustees and collective bargaining representatives are wholly distinct agents. 30
B. The Robinson Decision
Following the Amax Court, the Robinson Court found the requirements of section 302(c)(5) of the LMRA and the ERISA to be
consistent.31 Having determined the degree to which the judiciary
may scrutinize section 302(c)(5) trustees, the Robinson Court found
that neither the ERISA nor any other "command of Congress" suggested a different result.32
At issue in Robinson was an agreement made by the trustees of
the UMWA Health and Retirement Fund, which had been established pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between the
UMWA and the BCOA.3 3 The fund had been restructured in 1974
in order to meet the financial stability requirements of the recentlyenacted ERISA. These changes were specified in the 1974 collective
bargaining agreement between the UMWA and the BCOA.84 One
way in which the actuarial soundness of the fund was enhanced was
by limiting the extension of an increase in health benefits to the widows of miners. The agreement excluded from this increase the widows of miners who had died before the 1974 agreement and before
applying for their pensions under the 1950 predecessor agreement.85
In Robinson v. UMWA Health & Retirement Funds,3 6 the excluded
widows were denied relief by the district court. On appeal, however,
the court of appeals reversed the decision, finding the exclusion unreasonable and therefore violative of section 302(c)(5). 37
Finally, the Supreme Court broadly rejected the reasonableness
test applied by the court of appeals. 38 The Court also avoided the
29. Id. at 336 (emphasis in original).
30. Amax, 453 U.S. at 334-38.
31.

Robinson, 455 U.S. at 574-76.

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 576.
Id. at 563-67.
Id.
Id.

36.
U.S. 562
37.
38.

449 F. Supp. 941 (D.D.C. 1978), rev'd, 640 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1981), at'd, 455
(1982).
Robinson, 640 F.2d 416, 421-22 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd, 455 U.S. 562 (1982).
Section 302 (c)(5) plainly does not impose the Court of Appeals' reasonable-

ness requirement, and respondents do not offer any alternative federal law to sustain
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stricter scrutiny possibly required under the common law of trusts by
finding the source of the pension rights in the collective bargaining

agreement rather than in the trust itself. 9 Thus, while it is true that
trustees under a section 302(c)(5) trust must meet "traditional fiduciary duties, ' 0 the trustees in Robinson breached no fiduciary duties
by complying with the collective bargaining agreement, as the trust

required.41
The Amax Court had found that the "sole and exclusive benefit"4 2 language of LMRA section 302(c)(5) restricted the access of

both employers and unions to "specified benefits to the employees.

' 43

The Robinson Court, however, distinguished access to the trust fund

corpus from the allocation of trust fund benefits. 44 "None of the conditions [in LMRA Section 302(c)(5)] places any restriction on the

allocation [by employers or unions] of the funds among the persons
protected

by

[section]

302(c)(5). ' '45 Therefore,

while

section

302(c)(5) trustees are subject to the law of trusts in equity 8 and
while the parties to the collective bargaining agreement establishing
a section 302(c)(5) trust are subject to the duty of fair representation under LMRA section 301, 4 the decisions of collective bargaining representatives are not subject to "review under an undefined
standard of reasonableness. 4 8 Collective bargaining representatives
negotiating an agreement may, absent bad faith, trade the interests
the court's holding. There is no general requirement that the complex schedule of
the various employee benefits must withstand judicial review under an undefined
standard of reasonableness."
Robinson, 455 U.S. at 574.
39. The Court of Appeals . . . relied upon cases in which trustees of employee
benefit trust funds, not the collective bargaining agreement, fixed the eligibility rules
and benefit levels. Those cases, however, provide no support for the Court of Appeals' holding in this case. The petitioner trustees were not given 'full authority' to
determine eligibility requirements and benefit levels, for these were fixed by the
1974 collective-bargaining agreement. By the terms of the trust created by that
agreement, the trustees are obligated to enforce these determinations unless modification is required to comply with applicable federal law.
Id. at 573-74.
40. Amax, 453 U.S. at 330.
41. Robinson, 455 U.S. at 576.
42. Amax, 453 U.S. at 329.
43. Id. at 331 (quoting 93 CONG. REc. 4678 (1947) (statement of Sen. Ball)).
44. Robinson, 455 U.S. at 567.
45. Id. at 572.
46. Id. at 575 n.14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 164 (1959) ("The nature
and extent of the duties and powers of the trustees are determined . . . by the terms of the
trust.
...).
47. Robinson, 455 U.S. at 572. See Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
48. Robinson, 455 U.S. at 574. See Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. at 181 n.20.
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of one group of employees against those of another.4 9 The Robinson

Court held this rule to be as true in the context of employee trusts as
50
in any other.
C. Robinson As A Legal Abstraction

The Robinson Court refused to consider the reasonableness of
trading the welfare of one group of widows against another during
collective bargaining negotiations. 5 1 In terms of equity, this result

might seem inappropriate, but in terms of pure "legal reasoning, 5' 2
this decision is not surprising for two reasons. First, the Amax Court
had already interpreted the "sole and exclusive benefit" language of
the ERISA and the LMRA.5a The Amax Court had found that,
since the duties of section 302(c)(5) trustees were directed exclu-

sively to the benefit of trust beneficiaries as opposed to that of the
parties creating the trust, the functions of collective bargaining rep-

resentatives and employee benefit trustees were entirely separate.54
Collective bargaining representatives and trustees were left subject
to entirely different standards; the former under LMRA section
301 55 and the latter under LMRA section 302(e) 56 and traditional
49.. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
50. Moreover, because finite contributions must be allocated among potential beneficiaries, inevitably financial and actuarial considerations sometimes will provide the
only justification for an eligibility condition that discriminates between different
classes of potential applicants for benefits. As long as such conditions do not violate
federal law or policy, they are entitled to the same respect as any other provision in
a collective-bargaining agreement.
Robinson, 455 U.S. at 575.
51. Id. at 574.
52. In future usage, the scare-quotes around "legal reasoning" will be dropped. They are
present here to indicate an awareness, however dim, of a literature denying the validity of the
process of legal reasoning. See, e.g., Boyle, The Politicsof Reason: CriticalLegal Theory and
Logical Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. (1985); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private
Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
53. Amax, 453 U.S. at 329.
54. Id. at 334.
55. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982) In section (a), the statute states that
suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties. (b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in
this chapter and any employer whose activities affect commerce as defined in this
chapter shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor organization may
sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the
courts of the United States. Any money judgement against a labor organization in a
district court of the United States shall be enforceable only against the organization
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equity standards. 57 Consequently, the Robinson Court had no need
to find and express a principle to separate the functions of collective
bargaining representatives and section 302(c)(5) trustees; the separation had been established in Amax. 58

The second reason that the Robinson decision cannot be considered innovative is that decisions rendered under LMRA section 301

had already established a standard of conduct for collective bargaining representatives. This standard derives its authority from the leg-

islative history of the NLRA, as amended by the LMRA, 59 rather
than from the common law. Therefore, collective bargaining agreements are not "ordinary" contracts under the law; the sanctity of
collective bargaining agreements exceeds that of common law contracts.6 0 In the context of a legal tradition which already places

great value on "freedom of contract, 6 1 such a rule greatly restricts
as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets.
See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n., 371 U.S. 195
(1962).
56. 29 U.S.C. § 186(e) (1982) states:
the district courts of the United States and the United States courts of the Territories and possessions shall have jurisdiction, for cause shown, and subject to the provisions of section 381 of title 28 (relating to notice to opposite party) to restrain
violations of this section, without regard to the provisions of section 17 of title 15
and section 52 of this title, and the provisions of chapter 6 of this title.
57. Robinson, 455 U.S. at 573.
58. Amax, 453 U.S. 322 (1981).
59. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-185 (1982).
60. See infra notes 61-70.
61. "As the relation of contractor and contractee is voluntary, the consequences attaching to the relation must be voluntary." 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 237 (1963). See also
T. HOBBEs, LEVIATHAN, ch.15 (1651) as quoted in L. FULLER and M. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 49 (1981) ("The value of all things contracted for, is measured by the Appetite of
the Contractors; and therefore the just value, is that which they be contented to give.") See
contra M. WEBBER, LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (M. Rheinstein, trans. and ed., E. Shils,
trans.) (1954) as quoted in THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 231 (1979):
The formal right of a worker to enter into any contract whatsoever with any employer whatsoever does not in practice represent for the employment seeker even the
slightest freedom in the determination of his own conditions of work, and it does not
guarantee him any influence on this process. It rather means, at least primarily, that
the more powerful party in the market, i.e., normally the employer, has the possibility to set the terms, to offer the job take it or leave it, and, given the normally more
pressing economic need of the worker, to impose his terms upon him. The result of
contractual freedom, then, is in the first place the opening of the opportunity to use,
by the clever utilization of property ownership in the market, these resources without legal restraints as a means for the achievement of power over others. The parties
interested in power in the market thus are also interested in such a legal order.
Their interest is served particularly by the establishment of 'legal empowerment
rules'. This kind of rule does no more than create the framework for valid agreements which, under conditions of formal freedom, are officially available to all. Ac-
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the role of the courts in reviewing substantive labor contract terms.62
Both Archibald Cox"a and Clyde Summers 4 have documented
the difference between collective bargaining agreements and common law contracts. Without devoting excessive effort to the distinction, one example can be presented. A court sitting in equity is able
to reform an unconscionable contract6 5 and to limit damages to
' It can do
avoid "economic waste." 66
so even in the absence of proce-

dural67 defects in contract negotiations, such as duress, by reference
to the substantive 8 terms of the contract. If a consumer purchases a
commodity for an "excessive price," a court in its discretion may
reform the price to a more "reasonable" amount.69 By contrast,
"[t]here is no general requirement that the complex schedule of the
various employee benefits [established under a collective bargaining
agreement] must withstand judicial review under [a]
70

. . .

"standard

of reasonableness.
One unreasonableness limit does, however, constrain representatually, however, they are accessible only to the owners of property and thus in effect
support heir very autonomy and power positions.
62. See, e.g., Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 444 U.S. 212, 218-219 (1979); H.K. Porter Co.
v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 105-108 (1970); NLRB v. Insurance Agents' International Union,
AFL-CIO, 361 U.S. 477, 488 (1960).
63. Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MICH. L. REV. 1
(1958).
64. Summers, Collective Bargaining Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE
L.J. 527 (1969).
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) ("If a contract or term thereof is
unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit
the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result."); U.C.C. §
2-302 (1964):

(1)If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause . . . as to avoid any unconscionable result. (2) When it is claimed
or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to
its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the
determination.
See, e.g., Leff, Unconscionability and the Code - The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L.
REv. 485 (1967) (distinguishing procedural and substantive unconscionability).
66. See, e.g., Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 906 (1963). See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) CONTRACTS § 346(1) (1932).
(The expectation measure of damages is limited by "unreasonable economic waste").
67. Leff, supra note 61; Epstein, Unconscionability:A Critical Reappraisal,18 J. LAW
& ECON. 293 (1975).
68.

Id. at 295.

69. See, e.g., Toker v. Westerman 113 N.J. Super. 452, 274 A.2d 78 (1970).
70. Robinson, 455 U.S. at 574.
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tives negotiating a collective bargaining agreement: LMRA section
301.71 If an employee "can prove that the union as bargaining agent

breached its duty of fair representation," then the employee may
bring an action for breach of contract against his employer.7" "A
breach of the statutory duty of fair representation occurs only when

a union's conduct towards a member of the collective bargaining unit
is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.""3 Ambiguity in the expression of this standard has created inconsistency in its application. 74 Nevertheless, collective bargaining representatives are allowed

wide latitude75 in the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements
and have been permitted to trade the interests of one group of em76
ployees (and their dependents) against another.
The distinction at law between ordinary contracts and collective

bargaining agreements was recognized implicitly by the Robinson

Court.77 Furthermore, the Court noted that a trust is defined by legal rules different from those governing the collective bargaining

agreements. 78 Although, this rule is clear as a matter of legal
mechanics,79 and the "holding" of Robinson is easily understood, 80
the Robinson Court did not express a principle to justify the rule.
The Robinson decision does not explain why the distinction between
71. Id. at 575 n.14.
72. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 186 (held in the context of contract administration, rather than
contract negotiation).
73. Id. at 190.
74. "The Supreme Court's decision in Vaca v. Sipes, is like a giant squid." Summers,
The Individual Employee's Rights under the Collective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair
Representation?, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 251 (1977) (footnote omitted). Compare Local 13, International Longshoremen's & Warehouseman's Union v. Pacific Maritime Assoc., 441 F.2d
1061 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972) (intent test) with Ruzicka v. General
Motors Corp. 523 F.2d 306, reh. denied, 528 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1975) (negligence standard).
75. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953) ("Inevitably differences arise
in the manner and degree to which the terms of any negotiated agreement affect individual
employees and classes of employees. The mere existence of such differences does not make
them invalid. The complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected. A
wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative ...
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
76. See, e.g., Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953) (validating negotiated seniority system
granting some veterans seniority over employees with more years service to the firm by granting former seniority credits for military service).
77. Robinson, 455 U.S. 562 (1982).
78. Id. at 573.
79. Id. This is to say that Robinson was an easy case from a doctrinal point of view.
Robinson lies in the intersection of Amax, 453 U.S. 322 (1981), and Huffman, 345 U.S. 330
(1953).
80. See, e.g., Hurn v. Retirement Fund Trust of So. Calif., 703 F.2d 386, 389 (9th Cir.
1983).
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collective bargaining and other agreements is so important.81 The internal labor market model, however, does. It suggests that since collective bargaining agreements are a type of employment contract
and since employment contracts are often characterized by internal
rather than spot market terms, collective bargaining agreements are
often different from spot market contracts.
III.

THE INTERNAL LABOR MARKET MODEL

A. Perspective: The Spot Market Model
The traditional, neoclassical treatment of labor markets is identical to that of any market for goods: units of homogeneous labor are
sold to the highest of numerous bidders; absent market failure, a
market equilibrium emerges which is efficient and socially optimal.8 2
In the spot labor market, firms bid for labor by offering "utility bundles"' 3 to workers. Since utility is not necessarily maximized by
maximum cash flow, the highest bid is not necessarily the highest
cash payment. Rather, the highest bid is the offer which best serves
the worker's interest, or maximizes his utility. For example, some
workers might prefer a job featuring low health risk and a correspondingly low wage to a high risk job paying a cash premium for
the risk. Firms, seeking to minimize their wage bills in order to maximize profit, 4 will offer more generous allocations of those elements
of the set of worker utility bundles least costly for the firm to provide. The firm which can reduce health risk, for example, at a marginal cost less than the wage premium for risk will do so. The firm
which cannot reduce risk at a relatively low cost will pay the premium. The interests of workers and firms thus are aligned; those
workers preferring healthy working conditions to a risk premium will
tend to go to the firm offering relatively more healthy conditions
81.

Robinson, 455 U.S. at 576. ("But when neither the collective-bargaining process nor

its end product violates any command of Congress, a federal court has no authority to modify
the substantive terms of a collective-bargaining contract.") (footnotes omitted) (emphasis
added).

82. This is the traditional notion of Pareto efficiency. An allocation is Pareto efficient
where "[t]here is no feasible allocation where everyone is at least as well off and at least one
agent is strictly better off." H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIc ANALYSIS 145 (1978). See also V.
PARETO. MANUEL D'EcONOMIE POLITIQUE (1909). The reader is reminded that Pareto efficiency is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for the optimization of social welfare,
however defined. See, e.g., H. VARIAN supra, at 153-55.

83. See, e.g., K. Viscusi, RISK BY CHOICE (1983). (A "utility bundle" can be thought of
as the package of job characteristics accepted by a worker when he accepts a job. Depending

on their personal preferences, two workers might disagree on which of two utility bundles is
the more desireable).

84. See, e.g., H. VARIAN, supra note 82, at 8.
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than cash.8 5
This spot labor market behavior corresponds in theory to that of
agents in markets for tangible goods."" In a goods market, consumers
maximize utility by consuming according to their preferences and
subject to their budget.87 For example, consumers may be willing to
offer a higher bid on appliances that are not likely to cause physical
harm than for those that are. The firms which can eliminate such
risk at marginal cost less than the price premium will do so. Thus, a
self-enforcing equilibrium will be obtained.
In a spot market, whether for goods or for labor, a prevailing
price emerges from the interaction of suppliers and demanders.88
The optimizing behavior of the numerous market agents pushes the
market into equilibrium by driving the bidders and the sellers to a
position where they can do no better.89 At this point of equilibrium,
no one market agent can take unilateral action to change the price. 0
Any attempt to contract around the equilibrium will be undone by
other market agents. If one consumer balks at the price level, she
will be ignored in favor of the other consumers.
This property of prevailing price is central to the theory of the
spot labor market equilibrium. 91 The firm competing for laborers
faces a wage rate determined by the market; the firm itself, as one
firm among many, cannot affect the spot market wage rate. The
competitive firm, therefore, makes the profit-maximizing decision to
employ a quantity of workers, at the given wage rate, so that the
firm's marginal revenue equals the wage. The worker, as one
worker among many, competes for employer bids, but is unable unilaterally to affect the bid. He takes it or leaves it. A prevailing wage
emerges in equilibrium.
The strict correspondence between the spot labor market model
93
and markets for goods undermines the credibility of the former.
One objection to the spot market model is that it is static; that is, it
does not capture the critical fact that laborers do not offer and sell
85. EHRENBERG & SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS 216 (1982).
86. See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
87. H. VARIAN, supra, note 82, at 84.
88. Id. at 55-58.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 52.
93. See Kotlikoff & Wise, Labor Compensation and the Structure of Private Pension

Plans: Evidence for Contractual versus Spot Labor Markets,
RESEARCH WORKING PAPER No. 1290 (1984).
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their labor with the frequency and velocity that commodities traders
sell their goods. 4 But this objection can be met by applying the spot
market model sequentially so that workers and firms repeatedly renegotiate and reform their contracts over time. 5
The plausibility of this sequential spot market model depends
critically, however, on the level of transaction costs. 98 A spot market
transaction cost can be thought of as an entry fee charged for entering the spot market. If transaction costs are low, both firms and
workers are free to re-enter the spot market when renegotiation fails.
If transaction costs are high, the frequency of spot market re-entry is
low. For example, if workers lose something by moving from one job
to another, for a given wage level, then they will be reluctant to
move between jobs.
Common experience indicates that indifference between jobs is
rare, suggesting that spot labor market transaction costs are high.9 7
Furthermore, some empirical evidence suggests that, over a lifetime,
workers tend not to change jobs.98 Such a finding corresponds to the
presence of high transaction costs in the spot market.99 One possible
explanation for high transaction costs is labor skill idiosyncracy.100
When job skills are idiosyncratic, labor hours are not necessarily homogeneous.101 It is thus not necessarily the case, as it is in the spot
market for goods, that numerous and identical workers auction their
hours. 102 Job skill idiosyncracy implies that labor hours are heterogeneous, contrary to the usual spot market assumption. A different
model, therefore, may be more appropriate.
B.

The Internal Labor Market Model

Idiosyncratic job skills can take many forms. One worker may
94. In other words, workers do not necessarily have to leave their jobs to renegotiate
their labor contracts on a spot market basis. For example, a worker who is paid a spot wage
who discovers that another employee is paid a higher spot wage, might renegotiate his wage
without quitting. See, Alchian and Demsetz, Production,Information on Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REviEw 777 (1972).

95. Id.

96. Id.
97. 0.

WILLIAMSON. MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICA-

68 (1975).
98. Hall, The Importance of Lifetime Jobs in the U.S. Economy, 72 AMERICAN Eco-

TIONS

NOMIC REVIEW

716 (1982).

See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
Williamson, Wachter, & Harris, Understanding the Employment Relation: The
Analysis of IdiosyncraticExchange, 6 BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 250, 251 (1975).
101. See, e.g., Riordan & Wachter, What Do Implicit Contracts Do? INDUS. RELATIONS
99.
100.

RESEARCH ASS'N SERIES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE

35th

ANNUAL MEETING 291

(1982).

102. ld.
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have developed a particularly effective way of operating a piece of
capital equipment or of managing the flow of information through
the organizational structure of the firm. Such a worker is able to
behave opportunistically, guilefully demanding a "monopoly" premium for his idiosyncratic skills during contract renegotiation.10 3
That is, this worker demands not only a wage equal to his relatively
high marginal product, which presumably is known by the firm, 104
but also a bribe to renew his contract. The size of this "bribe" will
correspond to the level of the transaction cost that the worker can
impose on the firm by quitting.10 5 The source of this transaction cost
might be, for example, training costs incurred by the firm or the fact
that the nature of the worker's skills defies replacement.
On the other hand, the firm and the worker both know that the
worker's idiosyncratic skills are only useful in the context of his work
in that specific firm; he cannot export his idiosyncratic skills to another workplace. In this sense, the firm is a monopsonist, the only
buyer to whom the worker can sell his idiosyncratic skills.10 6
When a market contains only two actors, a monopolist and a
monopsonist, a bilateral monopoly exists.107 The problem of bilateral
monopoly is the problem of small numbers: numerous market equilibria, rather than one unique equilibrium, are possible, so the outcome is indeterminate. This bilateral monopoly problem can be illustrated by Kenneth Arrow's lighthouse example.108 Imagine a
lighthouse on an isolated and dangerous point of land. The lighthouse charges a fee for its service, and the shipping lane is so infrequently used that the chance of two or more ships simultaneously
requiring the lighthouse's services is negligible. A ship approaches
the dangerous point one night and contacts the lighthouse by radio.
In this hypothetical market, the ship is a monopsonist and the lighthouse is a monopolist. The two parties hope to agree on a price, but
no unique equilibrium price exists. Since numerous possible equilibria exist, only a range of possible bargaining outcomes can be predicted a priori.109
Id. at 297-298.
Ross, Taubman, & Wachter, Learning by Observing and the Distribution of
Wages, STUDIES IN LABOR MARKETS 369 (S. Rosen, ed. 1981).
103.
104.

105.

For an introductory source on monopoly premia, see E.

MANSFIELD, MICRO-

ECONOMIcS 281-87 (4th ed. 1982).

106.
107.
108.

Id. at 293-94, 403.
Id. See supra note 101.
K. ARROW, The Organizationof Economic Activity, in THE ANALYSIS

AND EVALU-

ATION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE; THE PPB SYSTEM 58 (1969).

109.

Id.
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The reason for this indeterminacy is opportunism; each party
has an incentive to lie.' 10 The ship's captain has an incentive to
promise payment once he has been guided to safety and then to refuse payment. Knowing this, the lighthouse owner is induced to raise
his price to compensate for the risk. But, uncertain of the level of the
risk, he does not know how large a premium to charge. The lighthouse owner has an incentive to demand pre-payment and then to
refuse the service. Knowing this, the ship's captain desires a discount
for risk, but cannot calculate the discount under conditions of uncertainty. No self-enforcing unique equilibrium emerges. The interests
of neither the monopolist nor the monopsonist are necessarily served
by this indeterminacy.
Both parties to a bilateral monopoly might wish to contract
around the indeterminacy. Indeed, if the monopolist and the monopsonist each anticipate recurring exchanges and recognize that each
exchange is likely to be indeterminate, they may attempt to contract
forward, hoping that the promise of a future benefit will discourage
present guileful behavior. But such a contracting scheme is problematic even if contract enforcement can be guaranteed. In the labor
market context, a contingent claims contract explicitly anticipating
and expressly addressing every event that could affect the workerfirm relationship would be so large as to be incomprehensible. No
human diad could possess the information-processing ability to foresee and address each relevant contingency. Even where the contract
parties are "rational", in the sense that they engage in optimizing
behavior, their ability to write a fully specified contingent claims
contract of such magnitude is bounded by "neuro-physiological" limits."' A contingent claims contract for a pension, for example, would
have to consider the effect on the agreement of every single event
which could interrupt the worker's service to the firm. The set of
these events would comprise every event in the worker's life, a large
set indeed.
Furthermore, even if the parties to a bilateral monopoly could
obtain sufficient information processing capabilities, one party in
possession of asymmetric information could misrepresent his understanding of the present or a future state of the world.11 2 In general, a
worker is asymmetrically well informed about the wage he would
receive in the spot market, and the firm about its labor demand
110.

Williamson, Wachter & Harris, supra note 100.

111. Id. at 258. See H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (1976).
112.

Riordan & Wachter, What Do Implicit Contracts Do? INDuS. RELATIONS RE-

SEARCH ASS'N SERIES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 35TH ANNUAL MEETING 291 (1982).
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schedule.11 3 A firm asymmetrically possessing information about its
own hopeless financial situation, for example, might be very happy to
offer generous pension benefits to workers, knowing that they would
never be paid. An explicit contract based on such false premises
would not secure the purpose of providing a stable basis for an ongoing relationship between the parties. To the extent that workers
know the firm possesses asymmetric information and believe the firm
is opportunistic, the workers will not bargain forward, thereby avoiding exposure to the firm's guile.
Implicit contracting offers a possible solution to the dilemma of
explicit contracting.11 Rather than specifying a complete set of responses to every possible contingency, an implicit contract creates an
incentive structure by which the parties jointly manage their contractual relationship."1 5 This structure allocates responsibilities on a
least-cost basis; that is, the party who can bear risk or gather information at the least cost will be given the incentive to do so. Where
information is asymmetric, the implicit contract leaves information
gathering to the well-informed party and limits the well-informed
party's incentive to behave opportunistically. 1 6 That is, the implicit
contract encourages truthful revelation. 117 For example, the employer is likely to know more than the workers about the amount of
labor it can afford to employ and is not necessarily likely to reveal
this information. An implicit contract allows the employer to adjust
this wage bill according to product demand not by allowing the firm
to lower the wage rate itself but by implicitly granting the firm the
right to lay off workers. 1 8 The laying off of workers certainly imposes a cost on the laid-off workers, but also imposes a cost on the
firm. A reduction in the number of workers, unlike a reduction in the
wage rate, necessarily causes a reduction in output. The firm, therefore, has an incentive not to guilefully lay off workers. 19
In the contexts of both implicit and explicit contracting, the issue of enforceability is critical. But, unlike explicit contracts, implicit contracts can never be mechanically enforced, there will not
always exist a "plain" meaning for each term of an implicit contract.1 20 Implicit contracts thus impose on the parties a risk of unen113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
See infra notes 116-119 and accompanying text.
Riordan & Wachter, supra note 112, at 295.
Id.
Id. at 295-96.
Id.
See Summers, Collective Agreements andthe Law of Contracts,78 YALE L. J. 525,
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forceability not present in explicit contracts.
Implicit labor contracts can, however, be made explicit (and
hence no more risky than explicit contracts) in two important respects.12 First, the contract can specify, to the worker's advantage,
that discharges of workers must be "for just cause." Because the
term "just cause" is not self-defining, its inclusion in the contract
invites third party interpretation, such as arbitration. Such a provision is a crucial limitation on firms where an implicit contract provides for a life cycle wage schedule; that is, a schedule of wages to
be paid during each period of the employee's working life. Under
such a wage schedule, a worker might accept a wage lower than his
next best spot market opportunity or even accept one lower than his
marginal productivity in exchange for a promise of a wage later in
life higher than his declining productivity. The life cycle wage schedule might also include a pension benefit guaranteeing retirement income. An implicit contract lacking this "just cause" proviso might
allow a firm to fire a worker in his later years, when he is still recouping the investment of his early years or when he is about to vest
in pension benefits.
Second, to the advantage of the firm, the contract can provide
for mandatory retirement at some age or experience level.122 This
proviso prevents a worker from working so far beyond his productive
years that the firm loses, in discounted present value terms, on its
investment in that worker's training in his early years. The symmetry between the worker's interest in a life cycle wage schedule and
the firm's interest in mandatory retirement provides the basis for
123
long term contracting between the worker and the firm.
An internal labor market is both distinct from and dependent

527-37 (1969); Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MIcH. L.
REV. 1 (1958) (the collective bargaining agreement is an unique contract which may not ap-

pear to have enforceable contractual characteristics.).
121.

Riordan & Wachter, supra note 112, at 297-98.

122.

Cf. Nalebuff & Zeckhauser, Pensions and the Retirement Decision, NAT'L BU-

No. 1285 (1984); Mitchell & Fields, Rewards to Continued Work: The Economic Incentives for Postponing Retirement, NAT'L BuREAU oF ECONOMIC RESEARCH WORKING PAPER No. 1204 (1983).
REAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH WORKING PAPER

123.

See Graph on following page.
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upon spot labor markets. 124 Internal and spot labor markets are distinct because the former is a substitute for the latter.1 25 But internal
labor markets are dependent on spot markets both for the "port of
entry" and as the standard by which parties to the internal labor
market contract monitor their relative position. Over the course of
an efficient internal labor market contract, wage and productivity
should be equal in discounted terms. 2 6 This is analogous to the efficiency of spot labor markets where wage and productivity are equal
1 27
at any given instant.
A lack of correspondence between the internal market and spot
market labor prices is, therefore, not necessarily indicative of the abWage
Wage
(Internal)

Marginal
Product

Opportunity
Wage (Spot)

Age

O_*

A

B

C

D

The representation above is taken from an unpublished paper presented by M. Wachter at the
Collective Bargaining Roundtable of the University of Pennsylvania Institute for Law and
Economics (Nov. 15, 1985) (discussing the internal labor market and rising union wage
premia). The graph illustrates an example of a long-term contracting scheme. The worker
invests in his training from point 0 to point C, after which point the internal wage exceeds the
previously superior spot wage. The firm invests in the worker's training between point 0 and
point A, after which point the worker's marginal product exceeds the internal wage. The firm
has an incentive to fire the worker after point D because the internal wage exceeds the
worker's marginal product. The worker and the firm are likely to negotiate a mandatory retirement date to occur after point D.
124. 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 77-78 (1975).
125. Id.
126. EHRENBERo & SMITH, supra note 85, at 319.
127. Labor market efficiency exists when the wage equals the value of the wage earner's
product at the margin.
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sence of internal market efficiency.1 2s The internal price of labor is
likely to differ from the spot market price by design.12 Furthermore,
due to the dynamic complexity of the internal agreement, it will be
difficult for an outside observer to know at a particular moment
which parties are being paid for what past, current, or future
contributions.
A sudden increase in the size of a pensioner's retirement income, for example, might result from several causes. One such cause
would be an increase in the firm's profit and a corresponding implicit
contract provision stating that the firm's increase will be shared with
pensioners. This would be especially likely if the internal price
charged by the currently active labor force is implicitly conditioned
on firm profitability. In such a case, the union, believing it had detected such a profit increase, would seek an increase in the labor
price and a corresponding increase in pension benefits. Another possible cause would be the existence of an implicit agreement that pensioners will be maintained at a constant standard of living. The labor
union, as the agent monitoring such an agreement, would demand an
increase in pension benefits during a period of unanticipated general
price level inflation. Different classes of pensioners, however, might
enjoy different standards of living, depending on their wage before
retirement and the number of years they worked before retiring. It is
conceivable that a union would be more sensitive to the needs of
pensioners, or their widows as in Robinson, whose incomes are relatively low due to early retirement. 30
IV. ROBINSON LAW AND ECONOMICS
This section will analyze both the Supreme Court's Robinson
opinion' 1 and that of the Robinson Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, which was reversed.232 The circuit court's opinion will
be analyzed first in order to provide perspective for the analysis of
the Supreme Court's opinion. Conveniently, for the purpose of understanding the Supreme Court's opinion, the three opinions of the
three judge circuit court panel contain three different approaches to
the economics of pension law.
128. See supra notes 97-127 and accompanying text.
129. Id.
130. Robinson, 455 U.S. 562 (1982).
131. Id.
132. Robinson v. UMWA Health and Retirement Funds, 640 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir.
1981), rev'd, 455 U.S. 562 (1982).
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A.

An Economic Analysis of the Circuit Court's Robinson

Opinion.
The analysis of the circuit court's opinion will be divided into
three parts. The first part will analyze the majority opinion, which
seemed to focus primarily on income distribution issues. The second
part will consider the separate opinion of the concurrence, 33 which
was based on a spot market analysis. The third part will consider the

dissent,13 4 which, like both the district court opinion 35 below and the
subsequent Supreme Court opinion,1 3 6 is consistent with the internal
labor market model.
1. The Majority's Concern for DistributionalEquity
One fact particularly disturbed the majority. The exclusion of
the plaintiff widows from the health care benefit extension could

have the effect of redistributing wealth, in the form of health benefits, to the survivors of miners who had contributed fewer years of
employment to "signatory" 13 7 employers than had the plaintiffs' husbands.13 8 The court's focus on the difference in years of "contributory" service, rather than total years of service, between otherwise

similar miners might appear at first to indicate an efficiency rationale. Such an efficiency argument would direct attention to the fact
133.

Robinson, 640 F.2d at 424.

134.

Id. at 426.

135. Robinson v. UMWA Health and Retirement Funds, 449 F. Supp. 941 (D.C. 1978),
rev'd, 640 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1981), aft'd, 455 U.S. 562 (1982).
136. Robinson, 455 U.S. 562 (1982).
137. When the husband of Mrs. Robinson died in 1967, pension eligibility required 20
years of employment in the industry, "attainment of age 55 and one year of signatory or
contributory service - work for an employer who is a signatory to the pension agreement immediately prior to retirement. . . " Robinson, 640 F.2d 416 n. 12. At the time of the death
of Mrs. Hager's husband, another plaintiff, the pension Plan. . .required 20 years of industry
service," attainment of age 55, and a total of five years of contributory employment with one
year immediately prior to retirement." Id. The requirement of one year of signatory employment immediately prior to retirement had been struck down as unreasonable by the D.C. Circuit Court after the death of Robinson but prior to the death of Hager and to the Robinson
litigation. Roark v. Boyle, 439 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
138. Like others that we have been forced to overturn, the eligibility rules contested here exclude from permanent health-care coverage survivors of miners with
substantial histories of contributory employment, while conferring that coverage on
survivors of miners with appreciably less signatory employment. Appellants were
themselves denied permanent health benefits despite more than 21 years of signatory employment by each of their husbands. Contrastingly, the eligibility rules qualify survivors of miners with as little as one year of contributory service for permanent coverage so long as their husbands actually retired before death.
640 F.2d at 422 (citations omitted). The Court noted that the present rule requires five years,
not one year, of contributory service to qualify. Id. at n.42.
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that the longer a miner's contributory service, the more the employers had actually contributed to the pension fund. To think of this
contributory service argument in efficiency terms is not, however,
fruitful. To do so is to render the majority opinion internally inconsistent because the court rejected the Plan's claim that its exclusion
was justified on the ground of financial efficiency.139
The court thus appears to have been concerned primarily with
the inequity of the result of contract negotiation; that the "wrong"
parties enjoyed a windfall at the opportunity expense of the "right"
parties. 140 This concern was emphasized when the court took note of
the randomness characterizing the opportunity loss of one of the
widows.141 "The facial inequality of this [contractual] arrangement
is further highlighted by the fact that the husband of one appellant
died five days after reaching age 55, having met all requirements
and intending to retire but failing to do so within the short period
elapsing after his birthday.' 42 In addition, the court drew attention
to the fact that the late husband of the other plaintiff actually had
temporarily retired before his death, but had returned to work "because he was unable to support himself and his family on his
pension.'

43

The majority appears to have been overwhelmed by the perceived unfairness of the ultimate distributional effect of the contract.
Certainly, the factual poignancy of the case lends itself to such a
conclusion. Furthermore, such a conclusion is appropriate if the
courts are considered to be the governmental arm responsible for
monitoring the distributional equity of labor contracts. 144 The Supreme Court, however, at least in the context of collectively bargained labor contracts, did not think so." 5 The Supreme Court is
139. The only reason [for the exclusion] appearing on the record . . . is that the
[contract] bargainers sought to eliminate an additional drain on the fund's resources
in order to peg employment contributions at a mutually agreeable level. But 'financial considerations by themselves should not be sufficient justification for an exclusive eligibility requirement as every exclusive eligibility requirement would have the

virtue of saving money.
Id. at 423 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
140.
141.
142.
143.

Robinson, 455 U.S. 562 (1982).
Id. at 564-67.
Robinson, 640 F.2d at 422 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 419 n.12.

144. Efficiency is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the maximization of social
welfare. See H. VARIAN, supra note 82; V. PARETO, supra note 82. To the extent that a court
knows the characteristics of the social welfare function and identifies an efficient allocation
socially superior to that before it, the court is justified in redistributing to attain that superior
equilibrium, assuming it is constitutionally empowered to do so.
145. Robinson, 455 U.S. at 574.
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justified in this conclusion to the extent that the following are true:

first, that labor contracting is conducted free of market failure, so
that the contracts are efficient; second, that the judiciary is not the

branch of government best informed about the nature of social welfare; 18 and third, that the courts, even if perfectly informed about
social welfare, are not better able to determine the efficiency of labor
147
contracts than the parties themselves.

2.

The Concurrence and Spot Labor Markets

The concurring circuit court opinion

48 joined

the majority opin-

ion and amplified the concern for the inequity of the contract provi-

sion. 149 The central concern raised was the absence of a "quid pro

quo"' 150 for the union's concession during contract negotiations.' 5'
The concurrence, however, added an efficiency rationale for the
court's result.' 52 This rationale can be characterized in terms of the
53
spot market model.
When two bargainers, symmetrically informed, negotiate a
trade, they first determine the prevailing market price for whatever
good or service is being traded. They do this because, under the assumption of optimizing behavior, they want to compare their trade
with other opportunities. They will select the opportunity that best
serves their interests, however defined. 5 4 The price emerging from
146. See Buchanan, Good Economics-Bad Law, 60 VA. L. REv. 483, 491 (1974); Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEG. STUDIES 189 (1973).
147. See supra note 146.
148. Robinson, 640 F.2d at 424.
149. Id. at 425. The Robinson Court held:
It is an invalidating taint that a particular group has been sacrificed, but it can be if
there is no good reason to choose that group and if it is so like others that are
included that one seriously wonders why it was selected for the ax. Judge Robinson's opinion [for the Court] points out the close similarity of plaintiff's group to
others which the joint conferees agreed to cover.
Id.
150. Robinson, 640 F.2d at 424.
151. See supra notes 82-102 and accompanying text.
152. Robinson, 640 F.2d at 424.
153. So far as I can tell from the record, there was no quid pro quo for the dropping of labor's insistence on inclusion of this class [of widows] and no reason was
given by labor for omitting this specific class - an overall agreement was reached
in great haste to avoid labor conflict. Iconclude that there was no reasoned decision
by both sides to exclude this group, but rather a deliberate and hurried determination by the labor side to sacrifice this class in order to reach general agreement
before the outbreak of overt labor conflict.
Id.
154. This statement applies whether the traders are profit-maximizing firms or utilitymaximizing individuals.
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the negotiation will, therefore, correspond to the price prevailing in
the spot market. Were this not so, the negotiation would be abandoned by one party in favor of another trade at the spot market
price. To the extent, then, that the spot market price of an offered
good or service is positive, one would be surprised to learn that the
offeror had given it away. 155 Viewing health benefits as services sold
in the spot market for a positive price, one would be surprised if a
party trading away health care benefits did so in exchange for nothing. Indeed, the concurring judge was surprised.15 6
When the union gave up its demand that health care benefits be
extended to the plaintiff widows, it priced the benefits at zero,157 contrary to the prevailing positive spot market price for health care. The
concurrence, noting the absence of a "quid pro quo," found this concession to be arbitrary in the sense that it represented an abandonment of other spot market opportunities. 58 The trustees of the Plan,
therefore, enforced this suboptimal spot market equilibrium by enforcing the contract's provision. The intuition of the concurrence was
that the acceptance of the suboptimality was arbitrary and
capricious. 159
3.

The Dissent, the District Court, and the Internal Labor
Market Model

The dissenting circuit court opinion was based largely upon the
Memorandum and Order ,of the district court below. The dissent
claimed that: "[tihe decision to limit plaintiffs to five years of health
benefits was both considered and rational. Whatever case hindsight
gives to its merits, the decision stands as a legitimate product of deliberate and good-faith collective bargaining."'' 60 The district court's
155. One of the axioms of both the theory of the firm and the theory of the consumer is
that more is better. See, e.g., H. VARIAN, supra note 82, at 6 and 82.
156. Robinson, 640 F.2d at 425.
157. The foregoing interpretation, in agreement with the concurrence, views the avoidance of a strike as negligible consideration. The reason for this is that although a strike imposes costs on a union, it must return a net benefit if the union seriously considers its tactical
use. Thus, the UMWA must have expected the net return on the threatened strike to be positive as it pressed its demand for extended health care benefits. Unless the union learned at the
last minute that its pre-negotiation calculations were wrong, a proposition for which no evidence was presented, then by abandoning the strike, the union abandoned a positive expected
return from the strike. It thus gave up something valuable for nothing.
158. Robinson, 640 F.2d at 424-25.
159. "[T]he record reveals that no reason was given for the sudden concession on this
point . ., no receipt of something (other than mere agreement in time to avert a strike) in
return for this concession." Id. at 425.
160. Id. at 426.
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finding that the collective bargaining agreement in question was the
product of "explicit, informed and intense bargaining," 161 was sufficient to justify its refusal to find the result unreasonable.
The district court and the circuit court dissent achieved a result
consistent with the implications of the internal labor market model.
Since the internal equilibrium, unlike a spot equilibrium, cannot always be measured at a given instance by reference to explicit contract provisions, it is not readily subject to substantive review. In the
internal market context, any number of implicit benefits could explain the union's concession. For example, it might be that the union
dropped its negotiating demand in the hope of generating goodwill in
the administration of the contract over its term.1 62 Alternatively, it
might be that the demand and coupled strike threat amounted to
sabre-rattling to reveal the union's bargaining power before the contract negotiations ended and contract administration began.16 3 The
possibilities are endless. The dissent, anticipating the Supreme
Court, remarked, "It is not for us to reform the trust agreement to
1' 64
conform to our notions of equity.
B.

The Supreme Court's Robinson Opinion as an Application of
the Internal Labor Market Model

Internal contracting allows workers to defer income in one period in exchange for income in the next.165 Workers might wish to do
this in spite of early period job opportunities paying a higher wage.
Workers are thus vulnerable in their later years to opportunistic behavior by firms: to the extent that a worker's productivity declines as
he ages, the firm's incentive to fire him increases. This vulnerability
is especially pronounced after retirement when the worker is completely unproductive from the firm's point of view. A forward-thinking worker is therefore anxious to know that his deferred-income employment contract is enforceable. Unions are one possible
161. Id.
162. See Cox, supra note 63, and Summers, supra note 64, on the relationship between
labor contract negotiation and administration. Both argue that the latter is a continuation of

the former.
163. See J. HICKS. THE

THEORY OF WAGES

146 (1963) ("The most able Trade Union

leadership will embark on strikes occasionally, not so much to secure greater gains upon that
occasion . . . but in order to keep their weapon burnished for future use, and to keep employers thoroughly conscious of the Union's power.").
164. Robinson, 640 F.2d at 426 (citing Tomlin v. Bd. of Trustees of Constr. Laborers
Pension Trust, 586 F.2d 148, 151 (9th Cir. 1978)).
165. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. See also Ehrenberg & Smith, supra

note 85, at 318-24.
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enforcement mechanism.16 6 From the employees' point of view, a
reasonably powerful union is a credible auditor of internal agreements between employees and employer. The formal grievance procedure created by collective bargaining is a common auditing
mechanism. 167

The Robinson Court did not face a situation where employees,
through their union, claimed damages against an employer for
breach of contract. Instead, the Court considered the claim of employee surrogates 68 against the pension trustees for a breach of fiduciary duty based on the trustees' unwillingness to reform an ostensibly arbitrary provision of the trust. For the purposes of internal labor
market model analysis, an employee surrogate's suit against a
LMRA section 302(c)(5) trustee acting pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement raises the same issues as an employee suit against
an employer. The central question is: what was the agreement between the employee and the employer? The fact that the employment contract was collectively bargained by a union is an important
consideration in the analysis of how the employee achieved the bargaining power necessary to negotiate a particular allocation of wages
and benefits and of how the contract will be enforced following negotiation. But the collective nature of the negotiation and enforcement
mechanism does not bear directly on the question of what the contract allocates to the employee. The Robinson Court, knowing what
the contract allocated to the plaintiffs, simply refused to interfere
6 9
with the allocation.2
By deferring to the terms of the internal contract, the Court
implicitly found that the contract reflected a bargain freely negotiated by the parties.17 0 Since the record contained no evidence of internal market failure, the Court had no reason to believe that the
contract revealed anything other than the best position each party
could achieve at the expense of the other. This is one way of saying
7
the Court found the internal contract efficient.1 1
Freedom from post hoc judicial scrutiny is especially important
in the context of internal contracting, which produces a schedule of
166. See generally, R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? (1984). See
also P. DOERINGER & M. PIORE. INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND MANPOWER ANALYSIS
(1971).
167. See, e.g., Ross, Taubman & Wachter, supra note 104, at 9.
168. The dependents of employees will be taken to be the employees themselves for the
purpose of illustrating the application of the internal labor market model to Robinson.
169. Robinson, 455 U.S. at 567.
170. See supra note 36.
171. Id.
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present and future exchanges. The current internal wage level is
meaningful only with respect to past and future internal wage levels,
not to the current spot level. At any given moment the terms of an
internal contract may differ significantly from those of a spot market
contract. 17 2 It would be impossible, in such a case, to preserve the
of a
internal contract while simultaneously holding it to the standard
17 3
"reasonableness.
of
name
the
in
contract
market
spot
This likelihood of inequality between the spot and internal wage
rates means that a court reviewing internal contracts for reasonableness has no meaningful current comparative standard. Without more
information, the court has no way of interpreting the difference between spot and internal rates. Such additional explanatory information is especially hard to come by in the context of an internal contract because the contract's terms are not necessarily explicit.
Therefore, the record before a court is likely to be devoid of any
explanatory documentation, as was the record in Robinson.
The lack of information, moreover, may have the practical effect of preventing a court from reliably determining whether two
classes are being treated differently, in discounted terms. The fact
that one class is currently paid less than another does not necessarily
mean that the lower-paid class has not been or will not be compensated for the differential. The current status of the compensation
schedule might, therefore, imply a wage difference where one does
not exist.
Furthermore, where a wage differential does exist, a court's lack
of information will prevent it from evaluating the fairness of the
wage differential. For example, as has been previously discussed, the
plaintiff widows in Robinson might have been better endowed under
the old contract than the widows who benefitted from the new contract. The new contract might, therefore, have been the result of the
union's attempt to redistribute pension resources to the less well-endowed widows. Such a distributional trade-off is difficult to judge in
terms of equity, especially in the bargaining context. When the employer grants an increase in benefits and credibly announces that
further increases will exceed its labor cost budget, the union faces a
172.

For example, the contract wage might not, for the moment, equal the wage paid for

similar work in the same industry.
173. Compare Robinson, 455 U.S. at 562 with Toker v. Westerman, 113 N.J. Super.
452, ., 274 A.2d 78, -, (1970) (In Robinson, the Court held that there was no "reasonableness" requirement with the collective bargaining agreement but in Toker, the court held
that the contract price was in excess of the "reasonable" retail value and was therefore

unconscionable).
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large set of alternatives. It can grant each member an equal share,
or a share proportionate to cash wage, or a share based on some
welfare criterion. Whatever alternative the union selects, some member of the union will be disadvantaged relative to another alternative.7 4 A court asked to review the union's decision would find itself
in a poor position to determine whether the union's allocation was
fair. After all, the court cannot be as well informed about the wellbeing and preferences of union members as the union leadership itself. Nor is the court as accountable to the membership as the union
leadership is. A court's deference to the union's decision is fully consistent with the circumstances which led to the union's decision: the
union, relative to the employer, was asymmetrically well-informed
about how the workers would like to allocate the benefit increase.
Since the union could discover worker preferences at the least cost,
the risk of union error in information gathering was left with the
union. Interference with the result of this low cost search would remove from the internal market the efficiency gain derived from the
efficient search.
By deferring to the collective bargaining agreement, the Robinson Court left not only information gathering but also contract monitoring to the parties. In light of the fact that internal contracts are
developed, in part, on the basis of low cost monitoring, this was a
sound decision. Internal contract parties allocate risk on the basis of
monitoring costs, among other costs. Absent a violation of the duty
to fairly represent union members as a group, the fact that the union
itself did not object to the contract equilibrium suggests that the
union, in its monitoring role, had detected no violation of the internal
agreement. There is, therefore, both reason to believe that the contract was efficient and no reason to disturb the efficient internal equilibrium. The disturbance of this equilibrium would have opened the
possibility of future judicial disturbances which would have compromised the finality of all internal agreements, thereby creating opportunities for guileful behavior. Contracting parties would have been
discouraged from pursuing internal contracts. To the extent that this
would have caused parties to leave the internal market for the spot
market, an efficiency loss at least equal to the spot market transactions cost would have resulted.
If the Robinson Court had reviewed the contract for reasonableness, parties negotiating internal contracts would not be free to depart significantly from the spot market. To do so would be to assume
174. Robinson, 455 U.S. at 563-64.
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the risk of judicial revision. To the extent that a court cannot be as

well-informed about the implicit contractual relationship between
the parties as the parties themselves, the judicial revision might produce a result that neither party intended, even if one party benefits.

The party prejudiced by the judicial revision obviously suffers a utility loss relative to the actual contract equilibrium.

The Robinson Court, however, could have considered the "reasonableness" of the UMWA trust provision by reference to some ex-

ternal standard. 17 1 The Court could have employed a spot market

model which would have implied that, at the instant of the Court's

inquiry, workers of the same productivity be paid the same wage and
pension benefit. Using age as a proxy for productivity, the Court
could have concluded that the payment of unequal pension benefits
to workers from the same age cohort was inefficient and therefore
unreasonable.

But the Robinson Court did not do this. Instead, it allowed the
internal labor market to follow its own course, granting to the inter-

nal contract parties the benefits won in contract negotiation 176 and
175. It is worth noting that the Robinson Court could have obtained the same result by
reference to an external standard. The Court could have found reasonable the penalization of
workers continuing to work after vesting. The basis for such a finding would be the determination that aging workers who earn increasingly high wages as their productivity decreases
should be taxed in an amount equal to the premium they extract from the firm. The Court
could have found the decision not to extend additional benefits to the dependents of these
workers to be a "reasonable" step in this direction.
176. The Robinson Court's opinion would probably not have been much different had
the contract been the result of a form of negotiation other than collective bargaining. In such a
case, the widows might have brought an action under § 404 of the ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104
(1982), which provides:
(a)(l) Subject to sections 1103(c) and (d), 1342 and 1344 of this title, a fiduciary
shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and (A)for the exclusive purpose of:
(i)
providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii)
defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B)
with the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with
such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character
and with like aims;
(C)
by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large
losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and
(D)
in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of
this title or title IV.
Although the Robinson Court, facing an ERISA § 404 challenge, might have framed its test
in the language of reasonableness, it probably would have found trustee enforcement of the
labor contract creating the pension plan to be reasonable under § 404(a)(1)(D). The Ninth
Circuit has held the standards of ERISA § 404 and LMRA § 302(c)(5) to coincide. White v.
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no more.
V.

CONCLUSION

This article employs the internal international labor market
model to describe an important legal standard in terms of economic
efficiency. The Robinson Court explicitly rejected the use of a "reasonableness" standard to review the substance of a collective bargaining agreement. Such deference to the terms of a contract is inconsistent with the spot labor market model, but fully consistent
with the internal labor market model. This consistency suggests the
implicit, though probably not conscious, employment of the latter
model by the Supreme Court. This conclusion is weakened by the
fact that it is not empirically falsifiable, given the unavailability of
reliable information regarding the Supreme Court's unpublished rationales for its decisions. The strength of the conclusion, however, is
its descriptive consistency with a developing theory of organizational
economics.17 Robinson would thus appear to offer an example of the

efficiency of judicial decision-making.

Distributors Association Warehousemen's Pension Trust, 751 F.2d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir.
1985)("Both section 404 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982), and section 302(c)(5) of the
Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1982), subject the actions of pension trustees to
review under the identical standard of reasonableness."); Hurn v. Retirement Fund Trust Etc.
of So. Calif., 703 F.2d 386, 391 (9th Cir. 1983) ("Both the Supreme Court and this court
have recognized that the Taft-Hartley provisions parallel the ERISA provisions and that trustees must meet the requirements of each."). However, circuit courts reviewing trustee decisions
under ERISA §404 have distinguished Robinson where the pension plan does not result from a
collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Hum, 703 F.2d at 389; Harm v. Bay Area Pipe
Trades Pension Plan Trust Fund, 701 F.2d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1983). But this legal distinction is not necessarily an important factor in post-Robinson pension trustee cases at the circuit
court level. Trustees should be able to find safe harbor in the enforcement of trust provisions
arising out of any employment contract. See, e.g., Moore v. Reynolds Metals Co. Retirement
Plan, 740 F.2d 454, 456 (6th Cir. 1984) ("Moore argues that Robinson does not apply because the plan in that case was established pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement
whereas the plan involved in this case was created unilaterally by the employer. We find the
logic of Robinson persuasive in either context ..
").
177. See, e.g., 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES; ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS

(1975).
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